SOUTH AFRICA. MAY 1986: AT A POLITICAL CROSSROADS?

Information and comment concerning current events and developments

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CONTENTS
Overview of Events
Reform Policy
Intensified Repression
Military Autocracy
Conclusion
Addenda
1. Affidavits and statement concerning S.A. Police involvement in the May 1986 destruction of Crossroads extension
2. Current Security Legislation

Issued from 5 Long Street Mowbray 7700 Cape
OVERVIEW OF EVENTS

According to sworn statements of eyewitnesses (Addendum 1) on Sunday 18 May 1986 S.A. Police led by W/O Barnard of Guguletu police station assisted vigilantes ('witdoeke') from Old Crossroads squatter settlement to burn shacks in the Yanile, Siphika and Toiso camps in the Crossroads extension. This led to the destruction by fire over the next 3-4 days of the whole of the satellite camp complex, leaving some 30 000 people homeless and in many cases destitute.

This action was followed by the announcement that redevelopment of the area was being taken over from the private sector (the Urban Foundation, which had been aiming to cater for all inhabitants) and would be done by the government for the benefit of the Old Crossroads residents. The refugees would have to move to Khayelitsha (site and service areas 'B' and 'C'). The authorities attributed the destruction to faction fighting and communal violence, and maintained that the police (and later the army) were there to maintain law and order.

The destruction of Crossroads extension is widely seen as yet another grim example of a countrywide pattern of state-supported black vigilante action reported from Black Sash Advice Offices over the past two years and documented by Nicolas Haysom in Mahangalala: the rise of right wing vigilantes in South Africa (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, March 1986).

Furthermore, it coincided with an event of major national political-economic importance, the SADF cross-border raids against alleged ANC targets in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana on May 19 - the day on which the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group was due to meet the South African Cabinet with specific proposals regarding possible negotiations with the ANC (and following a confidential report the previous week that press leaks concerning EPG were felt to be coming from within the S.A. government, seemingly to undermine the peace mission). The effects of the SADF raids on the value of the rand, and on S.A. currency after Reserve Bank action to prop up the rand, further weakened an already ailing economy.

In the same week came the heralded clash between the National Party and the AWB (Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging/Afrikaner Resistance Movement) in the northern Transvaal town of Pietersburg. N.P. commentators and state-controlled media used this to project an image of a government under attack from the right as well as the left (ANC - grudgingly acknowledged as African nationalist but defined as communist dominated) and struggling to carry forward a policy of reform based on Christian principles and respect for human dignity.

REFORM/..
REFORM POLICY

The extensively advertised reform programme includes the phasing out of influx control and the hated 'dompas'; restoration of S.A. citizenship to some of the millions of blacks stripped of it under the homelands policy; the possibility of granting permanent residence rights to 'non-white' immigrants; and the establishment of a National Council which will enable the Chief Ministers of self-governing territories and Blacks permanently resident in the Republic (excluding the self-governing territories) to take part in "the preparation of a constitutional dispensation which provides for the participation of all South African citizens in the processes of government" and grants Black South African citizens "a say in the processes of government which affect their interests". Parliament is currently dealing with relevant bills.

Meantime the Regional Services Councils, which radically alter second tier government, are already beginning to be implemented administratively. The RSCs enable Black Local Authorities to be incorporated into the structures through which racial separation and group areas (alleviated by certain concessions), 'healthy population development' and 'orderly urbanisation' are ensured at regional and local level.

INTENSIFIED REPRESSION

At the same time Parliament is busy with amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act and Slums Act, giving immense powers to local authorities and magistrates to restrict and redirect black urbanisation. Also with highly controversial security legislation designed to extend and intensify the repressive apparatus already available to the state. (Addendum 2) In effect, the proposed legislation will place the country under a permanent state of emergency. In all but name South Africa will be under martial law, enabling the government to deploy maximum power against any and all 'enemies', internal as well as external. The rule of law as understood in the western tradition will be effectively null and void.

MILITARY AUTOCRACY

The shape of a crypto-military autocracy still professing allegiance to western civilised values is becoming discernible:

- The State Security Council, as explained in Parliament on 11 March 1986, has established instruments and processes of surveillance and control at all levels - national, regional and local. The network of Joint Management Centres (JMCs), sub-JMCs and mini-JMCs act "both as the Government's early warning alarm system for internal threats to state security and as a lean, highly..."
highly mobile mechanism to defuse revolutionary unrest". (Argus, 12 March 1986)
For example, the Eastern Province JMC "found that in a certain black township
far too few toilets had been provided for a population of 100 000. (It) had
decided that this was a legitimate grievance which threatened national
security. It had pointed out to the relevant authority what had to be done
to rectify the situation." General Magnus Malan added that in a case like
this "the JMC could recommend to the State Security Council what action had
to be taken".

According to General Malan the State Security Council had "long ago identi-
ified 15 broad areas of common concern within the security field, ranging
from military and police matters through economic matters to community ser-
vices and cultural matters". The State Security Council is one of four per-
manent committees of the Cabinet, and the national security management system
is "closely tied up with a welfare and social upliftment action flowing from
the other three permanent Cabinet committees - the economic, social and con-
stitutional committees. The elements of welfare and security in the manage-
ment system are linked by the National Coordination Committee under the
chairmanship of Mr Eli Louw, Minister of State Administration in the Presi-
dent's Office".

- The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, which has
taken over most of the work of the old "Native Affairs Department" (graced
with many different names over the years), has acquired unprecedented admini-
strative and financial power to restructure society, physically/spatially as
well as institutionally. This restructuring is manifest in the Regional
Services Councils and in the recommendations of the White Paper on Orderly
Urbanisation. It is noteworthy that Mr Timo Bseukenhout, formerly of
Cooperation and Development ("Black Affairs Administration) has now become
a regional director of Constitutional Development and Planning; also that
Black Local Authorities, even at community council level, are empowered to
employ their own Home Guard and are being supplied with firearms for self
protection and for enforcement of law and order in the areas under their
jurisdiction (c.f. "Police respond to Zolani Allegations", Cape Times,
27 May 1986).

- Restrictions on the press are being intensified. Police exclude jour-
nalists from 'operational areas', including Crossroads on occasion during
the past week; Afrikaans editors who are 'too liberal' are replaced or
threatened with replacement; all newspapers function under pressure of
some 265 items of legislation affecting publications; newspapers deemed
too/...
too critical of the police are liable to be denied access to police information - on April 1, 1986 the Commissioner of Police addressed a letter (ref.56/1/3) to the Editor of the Cape Times advising him that police liaison officers and spokesmen may not pass any information concerning police matters or action to any member of the Cape Times editorial staff. (Cape Times, 22 April 1986) See also Cape Times Editor Anthony Heard's 26 May 1986 address to the meeting in Lisbon of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers.

These restrictions, coupled with control of most of the television and radio media broadcasting to South Africans, enable the state to manipulate the flow of information, disinformation and interpretation of events and thereby mould perceptions and attitudes in the population generally.

CONCLUSION

It has been well stated: "A people that cannot be governed has always to be conquered". In a situation of increasing resistance and ungovernment it would appear that the dominant party in the South African government is moving consciously in the direction of attempted reconquest, but doing so under the guise of maintaining law and order while pursuing acceptable goals like Orderly Urbanisation and healthy Population Development, managing the economy in the interest of improved profit margins for investors, and moving towards yet another "new constitutional dispensation" providing "separate freedoms" for different ethnic groupings.

To have any chance of success such a project would require continued and increased material and moral support from traditional western allies and other First World trading partners such as Japan, therefore would include systematic and sophisticated attempts to mobilise such support.

With that support the project might offer short term dividends but only at the cost of medium to long term escalation of civil conflict and endemic violence, increased alienation of the disadvantaged majority black population, and international military involvement.

We believe a scenario of this kind should not be ruled out as fanciful because unproven. We ourselves are taking it sufficiently seriously to venture into dialogue about it with political and private sector institutions that stand in the western democratic tradition and are presently still claimed as partners by the South African government. Hence this document which we commend to you as a contribution towards such dialogue.

(Mrs) Mary Burton
National President

(Mrs) Di Bishop M.P.C.
National Vice-presidents

(Dr) Margaret Nash

ADDITION 1/...
I, the undersigned NOZIMASILE NGQAGU, do hereby make oath and say:-

1. I am an adult black female, aged 24 years. My address prior to 17 May 1986 was SC 53, Nyanga Bush where I lived as a member of Mr Tade's squatter community. The facts contained herein are within my personal knowledge unless the context indicates otherwise.

2. On Saturday 17 May 1986 while I was in my home I heard gunshots between 9 pm and midnight. At midnight the noise was so great that I went outside. To my horror, I saw several shacks in our squatter camp burning and much panic outside. People were attempting to put out the flames.

3. I also saw a yellow combi with men wearing balaclavas as passengers coming from the direction of the burning houses. It appeared to me as if they were responsible for the fires.

4. I assisted in extinguishing the fires and getting people out of burning shacks.

5. The following morning, Sunday 18 May 1986, at about 9 am, large crowds of men from Crossroads arrived at Nyanga Bush wielding sticks, pangas and guns. Most of them had white cloths tied around their arms, were wearing black panti-hose on their faces and balaclavas. Some of them had guns and were shooting and burning houses as they approached. I recognised Mr Nevana one of Mr Nqobobongo and Nima's group. He used to live at Portland Cement before moving to Old Crossroads.

6. While the men from Crossroads were attacking, two caspirs patrolled Lansdowne Road and were at most about one to two metres away from the attackers. The policemen stationed within the caspirs did absolutely nothing to intervene. There were almost a thousand of us, women, children and men, standing on Lansdowne Road with the remnants of our belongings around us. When the "witboeke" attacked with pangas the police did nothing, but when we took stones to hit back at them in defence the police shot at us. To me there was no doubt that the police were not interested in stopping the attackers from Crossroads. It seemed as if the police were there to allow them to attack, shoot and burn our houses and prevent us from doing anything to stop them. The police were clearly on the side of our attackers.
7. I have had to leave Nyanga Bush since my house was burnt down and I am presently staying in the open air near Nyanga East under severe conditions. Living with me under these conditions are my two infant children aged 3 years and 1 year 5 months respectively.

... ...

N. NGOQAQU

I certify that on this 23rd day of May 1986, in my presence at CAPE TOWN the deponent signed this declaration and declared that she:

(a) knew and understood the contents hereof,

(b) has no objection to taking this oath;

(c) considered this oath to be binding on her conscience and uttered the words "I swear that the contents of this declaration are true, so help me God."

S.D. RAUBENHEIMER

EX OFFICIO COMMISSIONER OF OATHS

Practising Attorney RSA
C & A Friedlander
101 St George's Street
Cape Town

STEFAN DOMINIC RAUBENHEIMER
ADDENDUM (1)

AFFIDAVIT (2)

I, the undersigned, DAVID ANDREW HARTMAN, do hereby make oath and say that:-

1. I am an adult male aged 25 years. I reside at 6 Priory Road, Mowbray. I am a freelance photographer for Agence France Press, an international French-based news agency and Afrapix, a photographic collective. I photograph news items of relevance to international news and supply these to the aforementioned agencies. The facts herein contained are within my own knowledge unless the contents indicate otherwise.

2. On Sunday 18 May 1986 I was informed by World Television News that trouble had broken out at the squatter camps adjacent to Old Crossroads. I was required to go out there and take photographs. At about 1 p.m. I reached Nyanga Bush squatter camp with Craig Matthews of Worldwide Television News. We approached Nyanga Bush from Mahobe Drive and went straight to the office of the Executive Committee where people had gathered. From there, we saw shacks below us burning. People were standing on the hill around watching. Two caspis were patrolling the area and they ordered us out of the area. We then proceeded to the Portland Cement squatter camp at about 1 p.m.

3. We remained at the Portland Cement squatter camp till about 5.30 p.m. that afternoon. During that time I witnessed several incidents and I photographed goings on. From what I observed I got a clear impression that the attackers were the so-called witdoeke. They burnt shacks, shot at and chased residents of the Portland Cement squatter camp whose homes they had already burnt. I also got a clear impression at the police who patrolled along Lansdowne Road, adjacent to the Portland Cement squatter camp, and that they were 10 times less than a metre away from the attacking witdoeke, did absolutely nothing whatsoever to restrain them. We watched as witdoeke went from shack to shack setting these alight while the police in the caspis stood by watching.

4. As evidence of the above I refer to annexure "A" a photograph taken on Sunday 18 May 1986, by me at the Portland Cement squatter camp. The photograph was taken at about 3.30 p.m. The people facing the camera with weapons in their hands are the witdoeke. Those with their backs to the camera are the so-called comrades. Witdoeke had suddenly approached from behind the shacks and charged upon the comrades. Shots were fired by the witdoeke. The comrades tried to defend themselves by throwing stones. The caspir stationed on the right at Lansdowne Road made no attempt to intervene or stop the attack by the witdoeke. The occupants of the caspir passively looked on.

- 7 -
5. As the afternoon progressed we got the feeling that the police were becoming increasingly aware of our perception of their role in the events. Accordingly whenever a confrontation would flare up the casspirs tended to drive off and return later when things were relatively quiet in an attempt to escape the camera.

6. At one stage the vigilantes actually fired shots at people, the residents of Portland Cement squatter camp. The people dropped their possessions in panic and fled whereupon the vigilantes set their possessions alight. The police never emerged from their casspirs except to kick us out of the area later that evening. On Monday 19 May 1986 I went to Mahobe Drive at lunchtime to photograph once again. Thousands of people were squatting on Mahobe Drive with their possessions. The police was stationed in casspirs outside the Development Board offices. The vigilantes were congregating around the casspirs outside the Development Board offices and to our surprise were occupied in setting the shack at the Nyanga Extension squatter camp which had not yet been burnt, alight. They were doing this within a metre away from the police in casspirs who merely stood by passively.

7. The refugees as I have stated congregated on Mahobe Drive and some of them then moved to that part of Nyanga between Mahobe Drive and Sithandarturt Road on a field facing the Development Board offices. The photograph annexure "B" shows a group of vigilantes charging from the Development Board offices across Mahobe Drive past the casspirs and onto the field where the refugees were assembled. This was done in full view of at least four to five casspirs and several army buffels. The photograph shows a casspir on the right and an army buffel on the left. The attitude of the occupants is apparent in that they are doing nothing to restrain the attacking vigilantes. However, when the refugees retaliated with stones at the vigilantes, the police were quick to fire teargas at them (refugees). For most of the day the witdocke or vigilantes congregated where the policemen were, as though they were under police protection.

8. There is no doubt in my mind that the incidents witnessed by myself on Sunday 18 May 1986 and Monday, 19 May 1986, indicate clearly that the witdocke/vigilantes were acting with the support of the police and it was almost as if there was a conspiracy between these two groups to attack the residents of the squatter camps whose homes were destroyed.

D A HARTMAN

The terms of Regulation R.1258 published in Government Gazette No 3619 of 21 July 1972 having been complied with, I hereby certify that the Deponent has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this affidavit which was signed and affirmed before me at CAPE TOWN this 25 day of MAY, 1986

COMMISSIONER OF OATHS

Denise Erica Englebrecht 5 A Police 28 Buitenkant Street
Cape Town
SOUTH AFRICA MAY 1986: AT A POLITICAL CROSSROADS

ADDENDUM (2)

STATEMENT

1. I, Margaret Alice Nash, a woman of 57 years living at 118 Second Avenue Kenilworth Cape, wish to testify concerning the events at Nyanga Bush on Sunday May 18, 1986.

BACKGROUND

2. On Saturday May 17 I attended a funeral in New Crossroads of a young man in a family I have been friends with since they were living in Nodderdam squatter camp early 1977. He was a Zion Church member and a comrade; both were reflected in the proceedings. Everything, including a lengthy procession around Guguletu, was peaceful. During the graveside prayers unknown persons set fire to a City Tramways bus nearby. The police arrived in five armoured vehicles and the fire was put out. We left for the washing of the hands and everything remained peaceful.

3. On Sunday May 18 I wished to attend the farewell in Guguletu for Bishop David Russell. Because of a special service at my own church, Good Shepherd Kirstenbosch, I could neither attend the 9.30 am Bucharist nor join the later convoy assembling in Rondebosch at 11.15 am.

4. Soon after 12 noon I telephoned a neighbour of the bereaved family to arrange an escort into the township for the Russell farewell. She told me that they had been trying to contact me because of trouble in Nyanga Bush and asked me to come immediately. I telephoned the home of PFP Mr Tiaan van der Merwe and his wife told me he was already there.

NYANGA BUSH

5. Travelling down the Lansdowne Road I could see clouds of thick black smoke rising from the centre of Nyanga Bush. I was met near New Crossroads entrance and escorted to the home of Mrs Benge, 1190 Monwabisi New Crossroads. She told me Tiaan van der Merwe had just left and would contact with police. We waited for the Cape Times reporter to arrive and meantime I was told that there had been burning in Yanile's camp the previous night and since early Sunday morning.

6. Soon after the reporter Yazeed Fakir arrived and had been briefed an escort took us into KTC squatter camp to consult with Mr Helford Yanile. The latter advised us to go straight to Nyanga Bush to see what was happening.

7. We drove back along Terminus Road and into Nyanga Bush immediately opposite. Residents seemed relatively unconcerned, going about their usual mid-Sunday activities. It reminded me of going into the UWC side of the Unibel squatter camp on day one of the January 1978 demolition.

8. About 300 metres the road became impassable. We stopped and stood talking with men who were gathering in a state of anxiety. There were occasional rifle shots in the direction of the smoke. We wanted to walk forward but were warned it was dangerous.
9. Our escort went alone to investigate. Rifle fire increased and came nearer. Everyone ran and we drove off in haste. We parked more or less opposite in Nyanga East and Yazeed reported by radio telephone to the Cape Times office (Tony Weaver).

10. We heard intermittent rifle fire and after a while saw a crowd of young comrades running along Mahobe Drive in Lansdowne Road direction. People in Nyanga East were showing signs of anxiety.

11. We circled a block and returned to Mahobe Drive where things were peaceful, so parked and entered the camp on foot. After passing between many shacks we could see that to the left in front of us the fire was very large. People kept saying the police were there and were helping, so we aimed to get as near as possible in order to see for ourselves.

12. Eventually from Mr Sipika’s camp we had a clearer view and could see the tops of what seemed to be two yellow casspirs parked on the north-north-east side of where the fire was burning.

13. Moving further north we reached a point where many comrades were gathered and were advised to go no further. Immediately west of us and slightly below were two casspirs parked. The burning was moving towards them and suddenly one drove off in a northerly direction. I was taking photographs (Kodak colour slides now being processed).

14. At about 2.30 pm we noticed smoke rising from the camp of Mr Christopher Toise on the Lansdowne Road side of Nyanga Bush, at least 200 metres south of the nearest flames. The wind was blowing from the south-east, i.e. not taking the fires in that direction.

15. We went round to the Lansdowne Road. We found a buffels parked opposite the Mahobe Drive. From there on there were hundreds of people on the roadside with whatever possessions they had been able to salvage. Kombis and bakkies were coming and going, being loaded as rapidly as possible to remove possessions.

16. There were other armoured vehicles (casspir, hippo) patrolling up and down. At one stage there was a panic and people came running from the east. We withdrew for a while then returned and spoke with people.

17. People said they belonged to Toise’s camp. Men in balaclavas had come and warned them to leave immediately. They mentioned white men and some spoke of Barnard (Barnard is a police officer who speaks Xhosa fluently and has been active in the area for some years. People say they can recognise his voice).

18. By 4.00pm the fires were burning fiercely in both Yamile’s camp and Toise’s camp. I saw no sign of any firefighting equipment or activity, by contrast with the bus burning the previous afternoon when the reaction was very rapid.
19. I also saw no sign of 'faction fighting.' The affected people were in a state of trauma and disarray and when we had seen the comrades earlier in the bush they were gathering and watching but not intervening.

20. We returned to New Crossroads and still saw no sign of any 'mobilisation.' I visited the bereaved mother then returned home. There I spoke on the telephone with Tiaan van der Merwe. He told me that he had contacted the Guguletu police station and was told warrant officer Barnard was in charge but was out on duty. He had left messages for W/O Barnard and for Police Liaison Officer Jan Calitz but had had no reply.

21. I telephoned the Cape Times, Die Burger and some friends regarding the need for immediate food aid. I tried to obtain bread supplies from a bakery (unsuccessfully), purchased basic food supplies and with a friend returned to the Lansdowne Road opposite entrance to New Crossroads. We handed over the supplies and were advised it was unsafe to go further. While we were talking a caspier went past at speed, heading in Crossroads direction. The street lights were out. People said this was typical when there was trouble. Later when I telephoned the Cape Times and inter alia commented on this report Ronnie Morris who lives in Mitchell's Plain and regularly travels along that section of Lansdowne Road said the lights had been out for several nights. When I telephoned the Lansdowne after hours number of Cape Town municipal electricity department I was referred from one number to another without getting satisfaction. (Next day I ascertained that the relevant office is the Mitchell's Plain one and was told the matter would be investigated and rectified).

22. At midnight I had telephone calls about unrest spilling over into Nyanga East ('Mau Mau' and Zwelethu sections) and possibly into New Crossroads. There was great anxiety and some people were fleeing their homes.

23. I telephoned Guguletu police station and pressed to speak to an officer in charge. I was told that W/O Barnard was not available but eventually was told that an area duty officer would return my call.

24. At about 2.00 am Major Burger telephoned me. In reply to my questions and stated concern about what had happened and could happen he said that he had not visited the Nyanga Bush area that day and was still busy in Langa on important work. He expressed the opinion that what had been happening was typical of the pattern of unrest and 'faction fighting' that had been going on for about a year. He referred to terrorists being arrested and shot and said they were trying to "remove elements from the area" and to remove firearms. He confirmed that W/O Barnard was in charge and insisted that there was no need for alarm, that what was happening was part of an "ongoing process."

25. From the above and other information since, I am convinced that the role of the police was conscious and deliberate and has very serious implications of a political nature.

M. NASH
Legislation currently tabled in Parliament which if passed will further infringe civil liberties.

THE IDENTIFICATION BILL

1. This provides for the issue of a "uniform identity document" to people of all races. It does not do away with classification on the basis of race.

2. The Population Register is to be maintained and will continue to contain a great deal of information about individuals. (There is a list of 13 specified items of information which must be included. The 14th item leaves us with no defence against further invasion of the right to privacy: "(n) any other particulars determined by the Minister by notice in the Gazette.")

3. The provisions under which all black people have had to surrender all ten fingerprints when they apply for an identity document are not being abolished, but are extended to cover the whole population. (Palmprints as well as fingerprints will be demanded). This may do away with discrimination but extends the power to control. 

4. Failure to apply for an identity document within the prescribed period carries a fine of up to R500 or 6 mths imprisonment (as does failure to notify change of address).

5. An authorised officer (policeman or other person authorised by the Minister) may at any time request a person to prove his identity without delay. Failure to do so carries a penalty of a fine of up to R100. If the authorised officer believes that a person is over 16 years old and has not applied for an identity document "he shall without delay take the person in question to the nearest office" of a regional or district representative of the Dept of Home Affairs. (That may not technically be an arrest, but if people are stopped, questioned, and taken to a government office to be fingerprinted and checked against the Population Register it is going to seem very like arrest to them).

6. An employer or landlord must notify a representative of the Dept of Home Affairs of the taking up of employment or residence of the employee or tenant, together with such person's name and address.

7. The Director-General can appoint any public servant as a regional or district representative. A regional representative can appoint any person or body as an authorised representative. There will be a widespread network of control reaching to the furthest corners of the country.

PUBLIC SAFETY AMENDMENT BILL

1. The Minister of Law and Order may by notice in the Gazette declare any area to be an unrest area if he is of the opinion that public disturbance, disorder, riot or public violence is occurring....
is occurring or threatening in the area. This declaration will remain in force for 3 months but can be extended by the Minister with the approval of the State President.

2. The Minister can make any regulations for an unrest area which "appear to him to be necessary or expedient." He can do this simply by publishing a notice in the Gazette. He can declare any regulation he has made to be applicable outside the unrest area. (Regulations are not specified: this could include powers of arrest, search, confiscation, restriction of movement, media reporting, assembly, funerals, control over school boycotts, work stayaways; also indemnification of security forces from prosecution - i.e. any of the measures used during the State of Emergency).

3. The Minister can by regulation specify any penalties for contravention of his regulations. He can, by regulation, empower any person or body to make orders, rules and by-laws and to prescribe penalties for contravention of these. He can make different regulations for different unrest areas "and for different classes of persons."

4. The regulations can include provision for the detention of people. If a person is detained for more than 30 days, the Minister must within 14 days after the 30 days have elapsed, table the name of the person in all three Houses of Parliament (or, if Parliament is not sitting, within 14 days after the next session begins).

5. The declaration of an unrest area and the validity of the regulations are placed beyond the possibility of legal challenge by the specific exclusion of court interdicts and court competence.

INTERNAL SECURITY BILL

1. A police officer (warrant officer or above) may arrest and/or detain a person without warrant for 48 hours if he believes such detention will terminate or prevent a public disturbance.

2. A police officer (lieutenant colonel or above) may order the further detention of such a person for up to 180 days.

3. Such a person may be removed in custody from one prison to another if authorised by the Minister.

4. The Minister of Justice may make regulations concerning the circumstances in which such persons may be detained, and such regulations supersede provisions of the Prisons Act. (Safeguards: Commissioner must notify the Minister of the name of the detainee and place of detention "as soon as possible." After 3 months' detention, Commissioner must submit reasons before a Board of Review. Written, or even oral, representations from the detainee shall be considered by the Board of Review, which must submit a written report to the Minister).

This amending section will be applicable after proclamation in the Gazette by the State President, who must then table such proclamation in Parliament within 14 days (or, if Parliament is in recess, within 14 days after the next session begins).

Compiled by M. Burton