

CROSSROADS 1975 - 1985

FROM POPULAR STRUGGLE TO MINI-BANTUSTAN

1. PRESENT - Political and economic crisis, internally unable to generate capital as before, viz taxes etc
 - a. - divisions at leadership level
 - crisis of legitimacy
 - executive/headmen traditional power struggle
 - lack of popular support
 - unable to gain outside recognition ie Black Sash, Urban Foundation or W. Province Council of Churches'
 - b. Present executive - membership flux since 1979
 - petty bourgeois in nature
 - fearful of own structures of coercion ie 'police'
 - political and economic cul de sac
 - threatened by youth linked to UDF, CAYCO, WCCA
 - desperately seeking outside support

Result - call for elections for first time since 1979

2. PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT 1975 - 1985

a. 1975 - 1977

- 'resettled' in Crossroads since 1975 by BAAB officials
- harassment
- community organisations - women, schools, homeguards
- outside support - Quakers, B Sash, WPCO, UF, lawyers, community workers
- escape demolitions of 1977

b. 1978: INCREASING STATE OFFENSIVE & RESISTANCE

- intervention and 'indirect' tactics eg 'crime prevention', media propaganda
- women
- support group formalised
- joint meetings of all groups to plan strategy
- women lead counter-strategies eg Goodwood march
- "Muldergate" splits in Nat party over political and economic direction; hegemony of P W and verligtes esp. Koornhof
- change tactics to Crossroads - 'reprieve' (Dr K & UF)
- process of 'negotiations' suggested to 'solve' problems

c. 1979 : REFORM & CO-OPTION

- negotiations necessitate co-optable groups - community
 - outside support groups
- pressure on community to 'acquiesce' viz UF and 'advisers'
- lack of accountability to the community
- rise of bureaucratic, all male elite - centralised control

- survey - corruption and fraud
- Timo Bezuidenhoud as Dr K's deputy locally
- women ousted from 'politics'
- elections and Ngxobongwana's executive chairperson & 14 member 'cabinet'
 - petty bourgeois and traditionalists
- challenge from small grouping in community
- no support from outside support groups for 'dissidents'
- first major internal power struggle erupts - 3 dead
- executive and headmen now control Cr.
- active support of new exec. from local officials

d; 1980 - 1981

- fraud charges against some leaders
- confusion & disorganisation as BAAB takes over
- support groups no longer around
- people left c^{ff} survey, 3 month permits, Sp. Branch etc
- plans for New Cr. going badly, meet with Dr K more promises
- women attempt to intervene, partially successful
- move to New Cr. - geographical divide as well
- exec members 'screen' residents for BAAB - more tensions
- Nyanga Bush squatters in area, increase pressure on state; squatter 'problem' escalates

e. 1982 - 83

- exploitation continues inside community via 'headmen' structures
- 'progressive' mass-based organisations in other townships ie WCCA
- women found Nomzamo
- tension incr. between Nobs and Memani groups
- headmer become military wing in community, incr. repression & intimidation lead to April fights - 8 dead
- bed people - no support from leadership
- Khayelitsha solution - UDF meeting
- community organisation in shambles

f. 1984

- January fights - hundreds left homeless *the same group → K.T.C*
- repression and exploitation continues
- no critical intervention from UDF, WCCA etc
- attempts to gain control over New Cr. as well
- satellite squatter communities under Nobs' control, reproduce same repressive structures - internal fights and killings in December

g. 1985

- 'rent issue' - expulsion of 'collaborators' and Nobs' arrest

- residents move to Khayelitsha to escape repression & exploitation
- youth lead Feb resistance to removals squad
 - 'release Mandela & Ngxobongwana'
- exec: challenged by youth re monies and exploitation
- leadership divisions; power struggle
- upgrade proposals but no leadership or election
- Nobs autocratic viz UDF, CAYCO, 'whites'
 - 'retires'
- call for fresh elections
- public confusion - local and overseas

SUMMARY

- popular protest to bantustan-style politics through 'reform' process, political consciousness of rank and file oust economic gains in it for exec etc
 - moments when popular resistance peaks, state intervenes to support leadership. longest ongoing relationship with Cr. leadership
 - resistance to leave Cr for Khayelitsha shifted from sense of 'community' to political control gain for leadership
 - power struggle over who controls political economy of Cr - headmen or exec
 - want to maintain own power of social control not state's ie "Independence"
 - other reasons for not wanting to move to Khayelitsha eg 18 month permits ~~X~~
- Old Cereswood permit request not granted in 18 months*